Maryland Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 4

Article 4

A Call for a New Special Study of the Securities and
Financial Markets
Stanley Sporkin

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stanley Sporkin, A Call for a New Special Study of the Securities and Financial Markets, 46 Md. L. Rev. 915 (1987)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Commentary
A CALL FOR A NEW SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES
AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
THE HONORABLE STANLEY SPORKIN*

We are now entering a new era in the regulation of our financial

markets with the appointment of a new SEC chairman. We owe a
deep debt of gratitude to Chairman Shad, who, as you know, has

presided over the SEC for almost six years. I believe this is a record-setting term for an SEC chairman. I also believe that the Chairman should be congratulated for running a Commission that has
accomplished much and has reduced the tension between the regulators and the regulated. He has made sure that our securities markets continue to be the best in the world. Chairman Shad can be
particularly proud of the markets' continued high level of integrity
and investor confidence. I am prepared to say this despite the recent rash of insider trading abuses and the presence of other trading
market concerns.
EDGAR' is a most worthwhile project and a great monument to
Chairman Shad. The Chairman is also to be congratulated for the
Commission's superb enforcement program and particularly applauded for the tremendous strides it has made in ridding our marketplace of insider trading abuses. The Levine and Boesky cases are
of a magnitude that have truly enormous implications.
That is the good news. Although our markets are still flourishing and continue to be the best in the world, the securities industry
is beset with a myriad of problems that, if not solved, could have a
severe impact on the continued viability of our financial marketplace. Of particular concern is the way we are attempting to deal or
not to deal with them. In many instances, we seem to be just watch* United States District Judge, District of the District of Columbia. B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 1953; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1957. This is a revised version
of an address delivered on November 21, 1986, before the ABA Federal Regulation of
Securities Subcommittee.
1. EDGAR, which stands for electronic data-gathering analysis and retrieval, is the
computer system that the SEC plans to use for information filing. The use of EDGAR is
expected to reduce dramatically the amount of time necessary for the dissemination of
time-sensitive corporate information. Victor, Will EDGAR Pass Legal Muster?, Nat'l L.J.,
Mar. 16, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
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ing these problems as they erode the confidence of investors and the
integrity of our great system. In other instances, we are dealing with
Band-Aid solutions. Much more is required.
I believe the time has come to convene another special study of
the securities markets, like the one of some twenty-five years ago
that was headed by Milton Cohen. That comprehensive review,
which was entitled The Special Study of the Securities Markets,2 has had a
tremendous impact during the past twenty-five years in the shaping
of our securities markets. But because of the tremendous impact of
deregulation and the advent of a host of new problems, we can no
longer rely entirely on the solutions offered by the Special Study.
A major part of the Special Study dealt with bread-and-butter
issues. Indeed, one of the great accomplishments of the Special
Study was to take the first step in integrating the '33 and '34 Act
disclosure standards. Issues that were addressed by the Special
Study largely included the internal workings of our market system.
They pertained generally to our domestic marketplace. The new set
of problems is largely external.
At this stage, we are observing the development of a securities
market that is truly global in dimension. We are seeing the emergence of competitive markets in both Europe and the Far East.
With the communications revolution, it is going to be more and
more difficult for the United States to maintain its worldwide monopoly to the degree that it has in the past. We must meet these
new challenges in a direct way.
We saw the almost disastrous results experienced by some of
this nation's major industries when they failed to recognize the nature and extent of the challenge from abroad. As a result, such basic
domestic industries as motors and steel have been ousted from their
preeminent global leadership roles. If we don't wake up, a similar
fate awaits the securities industry. We are particularly vulnerable
since, up to this point, we have been dealing with these global
problems on an ad hoc basis and have not been trying to solve them
on a broad-range, integrated basis.
The problems are manifold. They range from serious differential disclosure problems to the uneven ability to obtain trading data
necessary to assure the market's continued integrity. Without financial and disclosure integrity, our market system cannot continue to
command the investor confidence that a properly functioning mar2. Report of the Special Study of the Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (5 vols. 1963).
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ket system must have. We also have made little, if any, progress in
establishing the necessary investor redress mechanism that a global
securities marketplace must have to survive. Investors must be able
to redress disputes and grievances promptly and effectively if the
market system is to be viable.
We have also taken virtually no action with respect to foreign
acquisition and takeovers of major domestic concerns. Indeed, little
has been done even to assure the continued domestic ownership of
entities necessary to our national defense. These international
problems are only a part of the external pressures that our securities
markets face.
Back in the Special Study days, many thought that the GlassSteagall Act 3 meant that brokers were to be brokers and bankers
were to be bankers. With the deregulation tidal wave that has been
with us over the past six years, we are seeing that competition
among markets and players is greater than ever. Here, of course,
there have been certain legislative solutions proposed and designed
to deal with the relationships among the various financial sectors. I
fear, however, that the proposed solutions might be too narrow to
deal with the very broad problems that exist.
Just as we can no longer look at our domestic securities markets
in isolation, we cannot define the financial marketplace as being
comprised only of brokers and dealers. The special study I propose
would take a wide-ranging look at our domestic securities markets to
determine what the necessary interplay between markets and players should be. The solutions sought must be flexible. We know
from experience that rigid standards are no match for those bent
upon overriding a strict regulatory system. I am not critical of the
tremendous innovation that we have seen over the past five years.
To the contrary, I think it demonstrates the great strength of our
free market system. But just as we need innovation in the private
sector, we need creative thinking from our public officials.
While some take the position that the marketplace should be
regulated solely by competition and that complete deregulation is
the ultimate solution, I am not prepared to subscribe to that view, at
least at this time. It may well be that an additional dosage of deregulation is the answer, but we will not know that until we have the
kind of far-reaching exploration of the issues that I am proposing.
3. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982). The Glass-Steagall Act prohibits banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System from owning any entity that is engaged principally in
retail securities brokerage. Id.
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One point, however, is clear: It is going to be difficult to integrate
the various worldwide systems as they now exist.
While brokers were lamenting the intrusion of banks into the
brokerage business, it now appears that the shoe may be on the
other foot. The Washington Post, in a recent article referring to the
new record high of post-depression bank failures, reported the
following:
L. William Seidman, chairman of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp., which insures bank deposits, also said
that deregulation of the banking industry and the invasion
of insurance companies, securities firms and others into
what used to be the sole preserve of banks will cause more
failures in the future.4
A number of other pressing problems need to be addressed in a
thoughtful fashion. The method of financing takeovers through the
issuance of debt securities of less than investment grade needs to be
dealt with in order to avoid serious trauma to the system. Whether
we describe this phenomenon as mirror or junk bond financing, it
needs to be carefully studied. In addition, we are seeing new methods of financing on virtually a daily basis. Now broker-dealers seem
to be abandoning their customary, traditional advisory role; they are
becoming principals in the takeover battle by providing the financing and, in some instances, taking an equity position. Such activities
create only a small part of the many issues arising out of corporate
changes in control. Moreover, unlike the past, all corporate enterprises are vulnerable. The Business Roundtable is very concerned
over the current trend of more and bigger takeover battles and is
considering steps to make our major corporations virtually impregnable to a takeover assault. Some suggest that the proposed cure
might be worse than the disease. In any event, where all this will
end is unclear.
A new, broad assessment of this entire area is increasingly becoming an absolute necessity. The Commission's Study on Takeovers 5 was fine as far as it went. A broader review, however, is
necessary to establish a regulatory mechanism that is able to adjust
itself as new problems emerge-problems such as the silent takeover, which is epitomized by what recently happened at one major
4. Rowe, Jr., Four Added Bank Failures Set Post-Depression Record, Wash. Post, Nov. 7,
1986, at Al, col. 3.
5. ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON TENDER OFFERS, U.S. SEC, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS (1983).
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concern and which looms on the horizon for other companies. I am
not advocating any one particular solution. But I am saying we need
to look at the entire takeover mechanism to see what, if anything, is
necessary to make the process more equitable.
The study I propose should also take a new look at the entire
corporate governance issue. The impetus for reform is no longer
being driven exclusively by academia, but is coming, in part, from
the corporate community itself. Indeed, the most renowned takeover merchants are rationalizing their existence on the bases that
the existing system is malfunctioning and that without any meaningful oversight of their activities, poor managements continue to make
poor decisions. In this regard, I invite your attention to a recent
Newsweek interview with Carl Icahn, the new head of TWA, where the
following appears: "In theory, corporate boards of directors are
supposed to ensure that management is working in the best interests of the shareholders. But Icahn believes that boards rarely act as
a check on poor managers." 6 Quoting Icahn, the article continues:
I was on the board of one company and really it's a
frightening thing. I won't say which because I made a lot
of money with it. They used to have board meetings at 8 in
the morning out in Cleveland. Here's what goes on. Literally, half the board is dozing off. The other half is reading
The Wall Street Journal. And then they put slides up a lot
and nobody can understand the slides and when it gets
dark they all doze off.7
"Bloated, risk-averse, inefficient and unimaginative" are recent
words used to describe American business management. 8 Many
would think that these are the words of a Ralph Nader-they are
not. They were the comments of the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.9 And recently a news account of a speech by the late Malcolm
Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce, reported:
American industries have "lost ground to foreign competitors because of shortsighted management."
"We were simply outmanaged," said [Secretary] Baldridge ...... Most of all, we lost our reputation for quality
when we had been the world's leader. There is no excuse
for that and there is no one to blame but American man6. Confessions of a Raider, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 1986, at 54.
7. Id.
8. Rowen, U.S. Official Raps Business Executives, Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1986, at G1, col.
9. Id.
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In the corporate governance area, we must also carefully study
whether abandoning the one-share, one-vote principle might not be
a regressive step. There has been much discussion as to whether we
are so interested in short-term performance that we have squandered the future of many of our outstanding industrial concerns.
We need to examine closely this extremely important issue and, if
true, to come up with curative measures. The professional liability
insurance crisis brought about by the continued explosion of corporate litigation and suits against accountants and other professionals
is another issue that requires thoughtful consideration.
The internal mechanism of the marketplace certainly needs a
fresh look after twenty-five years. Especially is this so now that we
are on the verge of inaugurating twenty-four hour trading markets.
We are now seeing the emergence of new products on almost a
daily basis. Years ago many market experts were somewhat leery
about the advent of trading in options on securities. Now we have
not only trading in options on securities, but we have trading in all
kinds of variations of options. Indeed, we even have trading in options on stock indexes without an underlying security for sale. The
distinction between trading in commodities and trading in securities
is thus becoming blurred. Program trading is another new phenomenon that needs careful study. These various new trading vehicles
have had a tremendous impact on the marketplace. Whether they
serve investor interests in any meaningful way has not been determined. Some believe the marginal benefits they produce are far
outweighed by the detrimental impact they have on the marketplace.
We must obtain more knowledge of the entire marketplace and
what the market system of the Twenty-First Century should encompass. Is it better to have trading markets that are unencumbered by
all these satellite markets, or should we continue with the present
virtually unorganized markets? In other words, do we continue with
a system in which, as they are invented, new trading vehicles continue to be appended to the present trading market apparatus?
One of the virtues of our free enterprise system is the innovation that it spawns. Sometimes, however, an inordinate price must
be paid in order to realize the full potential of our free market system. For example, virtually every time a new product is introduced,
10. Auerbach, BaldridgeJoins Attack on U.S. Finns, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1986, at El,

col. 2.
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the so-called pack syndrome comes into play, and we soon find ourselves surrounded with untold numbers of variations of the same
product. This leads to an oversaturation of the marketplace, with
attendant adverse consequences.
Another important area that needs to be examined is the relationship between our national market system and state regulation of
securities. While I have always believed the states have a meaningful role to play in the regulation of our securities markets, the time
has come to determine precisely what that role should be and how
we can remove from our capital-raising mechanisms unnecessary
regulatory impediments. Duplicative regulation can have a severe
impact on our ability to raise new capital efficiently.
The tension between securities and futures trading is on the increase. The regulatory oversight of the interplay of these two markets is inconsistent and, in some instances, nonexistent. There is a
real need to reexamine the respective roles of the SEC and CFTC in
this important area.
The proposed study should also look at certain enforcement issues, such as the appropriate resource level for the enforcement
program and the allocation of the enforcement workload among the
self-regulatory bodies, the states, and the SEC. In addition to looking at how we can better deal with insider trading abuses, the proposed study should also review the various financial debacles that
have taken place over the past decade in order to see what lessons
we can learn from them and what new enforcement weapons are
needed to prevent their recurrence. The better use of automation
in market surveillance and in disseminating corporate information
should also be a key part of the proposed study.
The appropriate role of risk arbitrage in the marketplace has
not been fully circumscribed. Indeed, some have questioned the
propriety of the methods and techniques used in this process. In
any event, a close examination of this important market function is
long overdue. This is particularly so in view of the recent events as
they pertain to the market game dujour, which I call GreedGate.
New forms of credit extensions and expansions of existing techniques need examination. This would encompass a close look at the
expanded use of repurchase agreements, the explosion of new offerings of mortgage-backed securities, and the distribution of other
wrap-around debt instruments.
A broad-based study of the financial markets, as proposed, can
be an extraordinarily exciting and immensely worthwhile project.
The main purpose of such a study would not necessarily be geared
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to finding solutions for all of these problems. Rather, the study
would be considered a tremendous success if it merely disclosed
how the markets are affected by the internal and external factors
now in operation. I would hope that this proposal would be well
received by both the Commission and its Oversight Congressional
Committees. We all learned a great deal from the 1962 Study. It
was a great effort and has proved to be of tremendous assistance
both to regulators and market participants. A new study, at this
time, should have a similar impact in shaping the financial markets
for the next twenty-five years.

